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I. INTRODUCTION
A consumer purchases a manufactured home from a
commercial vendor.' As part of the commercial transaction, the
consumer and vendor execute a sales agreement containing the
following arbitration clause: "All disputes, claims, or controversies
arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which
result from this Contract... shall be resolved by binding
arbitration ....,,2
The manufacturer of the home is not a party to the
sales contract. Rather, the manufacturer issues a separate warranty
agreement in connection with the consumer's purchase.
When the consumer discovers defects in the home, the consumer sues both the commercial vendor and the manufacturer. The
consumer and vendor arbitrate their dispute according to the terms of
the sales contract. The manufacturer, however, did not execute an
arbitration agreement with the consumer and was not a party to the
original sales contract. Nevertheless, the nonsignatory manufacturer
of the home attempts to compel arbitration of the consumer's claims
pursuant to the underlying sales agreement. Alabama courts have
repeatedly confronted this fact pattern. 3 On such facts, both Alabama
and federal courts have struggled to determine whether the nonsignatory may compel arbitration of the signatory's claims pursuant
4
to an underlying agreement containing an arbitration clause.

1.
The following hypothetical arises from the facts of Ex parte Isbell, No. CV-95-8362,
1997 WL 679418, at *1-*2 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997).
2.
This arbitration provision duplicates the provision at issue in Ex parte Isbell. See id.
at *1.
3.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1532 (M.D. Ala.) (holding
that a nonsignatory mobile home manufacturer could not compel the plaintiff-signatory to
arbitrate claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and a commercial
vendor), affd without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997); Ex parte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883,
884-87 (Ala. 1996) (same); Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 373 (Ala. 1996) (holding that a
nonsignatory mobile home manufacturer could compel arbitration of a plaintiff-purchaser's
claims pursuant to a purchaser-vendor contract).
4.
See infra Part H.B.4 and notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Note analyzes the federal courts' use of equitable
estoppel to force signatories to arbitrate claims against nonsignatories
despite the lack of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. 5 Part III of this Note examines the Alabama Supreme Court's
hostility towards arbitration. Alabama courts have resisted a fullscale adoption of federal arbitration policy. Indeed, Alabama courts
have traditionally refused to apply the federal doctrine of equitable
estoppel to compel arbitration with nonsignatories. 6
Part III
documents the clash between the federal doctrine of equitable
estoppel and Alabama's inveterate hostility to arbitration agreements.
After longstanding resistance to federal principles, the Alabama
Supreme Court recently acknowledged the viability of equitable
estoppel in the case of Ex parte Isbell.7 But in Isbell, the Alabama
Supreme Court acknowledged a version of equitable estoppel which is
8
potentially narrower than the scope of the federal doctrine. Part III
also examines the Alabama Supreme Court's derivative version of
equitable estoppel. The conclusion of this Note argues in favor of the
Alabama court's estoppel analysis as an appropriate retrenchment of
an expansive federal policy favoring arbitration.
II. FEDERAL ARBITRATION POLICY

A. Presumptionin Favorof Arbitration
In 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 9
to provide a statutory mechanism for the enforcement of private arbitration agreements. 10 The statute reversed an entrenched common
law hostility towards arbitration." Both the English and American

5.
See infra Part II.B.4.
6.
See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
7.
No. CV-95-8362, 1997 WL 679418, at *7-*10 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997).
8.
See infra Part III.E.
9.
See ch. 213, 43 Stat. 888 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)).
10. See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (1985) (stating that Congress enacted the legislation
based on a New York statute to provide an alternative to litigation).
11. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (stating that
the FAA was "designed 'to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate'") (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)); Scherk v.
Alberto.Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (stating that the "United States Arbitration
Act ... revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements"); see also infra note
12.
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judiciary traditionally protected jurisdiction of the courts by refusing
to enforce private arbitration agreements. 12 The increasing volume
and cost of litigation, however, motivated Congress to override judicial resistance to arbitration by enacting the FAA. 13
Section 2 of the FAA specifically provides that "[a] written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable." 14 Under section 3 of the statute, a court may stay
proceedings if the court determines the issue is arbitrable under the
terms of a valid arbitration agreement. 15 Pursuant to section 4 of the
FAA, a court may compel arbitration of a dispute if a party alleges
"failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration."16
The Supreme Court interpreted section 2 of the FAA as creating a federal substantive body of arbitration law.Y7 The Court simul12. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) ("The need for the [FAA] arises from an
anachronism of our American law. Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English
courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon
the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction."); see also Hirsham,
supra note 10, at 1309-12 (discussing the common law hostility towards arbitration).
13. See Scherk, 417 U.S at 510-11; Hirshman, supra note 10, at 1310-11; see also Julius
Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal ArbitrationLaw, 12 VA.L. REV. 265, 269
(1926) (arguing that "[tihe evils which arbitration is intended to correct are three in number:
(1) The long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law .... (2) The expense of
litigation .... (3) The failure through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when
measured by the standards of the business world").
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
15. See id. § 3. In relevant part, section 3 states that a court, "upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration [under a written
arbitration] agreement shall.., stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the agreement." Id.
16. Id. § 4. In practice, a party invokes sections 3 and 4 simultaneously: "[A] party
involved in litigation... may move the court for an order compelling arbitration under § 4 and
for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration under § 3." Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson,
684 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala. 1996).
17. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967). But see H.R. REP.
No. 68-96, at 1 (citing Congress's Commerce Clause powers as one source of the FAA's validity,
but stating that "[w~hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought"); Cohen &
Dayton, supra note 13, at 275 (arguing that the validity of the FAA "rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal
courts"); Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitrationof State-Law Claims by Employees: An Argument
for ContainingFederalArbitrationLaw, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1695, 1707-12 (1995) (tracing the
Supreme Court's development of federal substantive law under the FAA and arguing that
Congress never intended the FAA to create broad substantive rules); Scott R. Swier, Note, The
Tenuous Tale of the Terrible Termites: The Federal ArbitrationAct and the Court's Decision to
Interpret Section Two in the BroadestPossibleManner: Allied Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc.
v. Dobson, 41 S.D. L. REV. 131, 142-46 (1996) (discussing the source of congressional authority
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taneously construed the FAA as a declaration of federal policy in favor
of arbitration. 18 This new federal policy countered the long-standing
common law hostility towards arbitration by subjecting arbitration
agreements to judicial enforiement. 19 Therefore, agreements to arbitrate are contracts subject to enforcement under general principles of
contract law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the presence of an arbitration provision in a contract creates a presumption
that grievances asserted in connection with that contract fall within
the scope of the underlying arbitration provision. 20
But as a countervailing principle of contract law, a party is not
bound to the terms of an arbitration provision in the absence of assent.21 Indeed, the FAA conditions the validity of an arbitration
agreement upon the existence of a writing between parties. 22 Courts,

however, have refused to interpret the writing requirement as a statute of frauds provision limiting the range of enforceability to signatounderlying the enactment of the FAA and examining the Supreme Court's questionable determination that Congress passed the FAA under its Commerce Clause powers, thereby establishing federal substantive law).
18. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (holding,
in the context of collective bargaining agreements, that the appearance of an arbitration
provision in a contract creates a presumption of arbitrabililty); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 10 (1984) ("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration .... ."); Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 ("Section 2 is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements ... ."). But see Rita M.
Cain, Preemption of State Arbitration Statutes: The Exaggerated Federal Policy Favoring
Arbitration, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 11-13 (1993) (arguing that Congress never intended the FAA
to create an expansive federal policy favoring arbitration, but rather intended the FAA to
enforce arbitration agreements between business entities); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the
Constitutionalityof the Supreme Court'sPreferencefor BindingArbitration: A FreshAssessment
of Jury Trial,Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 29-47 (1997)
(tracing the Supreme Court's development of an expansive federal policy favoring arbitration
and arguing that this expansive policy violates the Constitution).
19. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (observing that the
United States Arbitration Act was designed to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
("Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to
make the contracting party live up to his agreement.").
20. See AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650 (observing, in the collective bargaining agreement
context, that 'there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that 'aln order to arbitrate the
particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute'")
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
21. See id. at 648 (conditioning arbitration upon the consent of contracting parties); see
also Roberson v. Money Tree, 954 F. Supp 1519, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1997) ("It is almost axiomatic,
as a first rule of contract law, that parties must manifest assent to a bargain in order to be
bound under it.... Hence... a party who has not agreed to do so may not be required to
submit to arbitration.") (citation omitted).
22. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d
Cir. 1960) (stating that a written agreement is the "sine qua non of an enforceable arbitration
agreement").
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ries.m Rather, courts have used ordinary contract principles of assent

to extend the provisions of a written instrument to include nonsignatories.2 Federal policy compels the use of such principles to effect the
broadest reading of an arbitration provision to include the broadest
range of parties. 25 The Supreme Court clearly expressed its support of
arbitration by specifically instructing lower courts to resolve contractual ambiguities concerning the scope of an arbitration provision in
favor of enforcement.26

Nevertheless, contract law limits enforcement of arbitration
provisions to those parties who have agreed to submit their claims to
the forum.27 Therefore, the expansive enforcement policy of federal
law conflicts with the limitations of contract law.28 To resolve this
conflict, federal courts have applied theories such as estoppel and
29
equitable estoppel to attempt to strike an appropriate balance.
B. Development of EquitableEstoppel
1. Traditional Doctrine of Estoppel
In Deloitte Noraudit,A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, U.S., an
international accounting firm executed a contract with its regional
23.

See Fisser,282 F.2d at 233.

24. See Frederick E. Sherman & Steven C. Bennett, Although Obligations to Arbitrate
Generally Are Viewed as Requiring Consent, in a Variety of Instances Courts Have Held that
Non-Signatoriesare Similarly Bound, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 1995, at B4 ("Courts have recognized
at least five theories by which a non-signatory may be bound to arbitrate: incorporation by
reference, assumption, agency, veil piercing and estoppel.").
25. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(noting that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration").
26. See id. at 24-25.
27. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (noting
that a party who did not agree to arbitration cannot be required to arbitrate any claim); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (stating that a "party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any, dispute which he has not agreed so to submit");
Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Berry Constr., Inc., 984 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1993)
(stating that enforcement of arbitration is predicated on agreement to arbitrate disputes);
Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Although there is a
presumption in favor of arbitration,.., the parties will not be required to arbitrate when they
have not agreed to do so.").
28. See Alison Brooke Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal
ArbitrationAct, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1137, 1154-55 (1986) ("The federal courts face the problem of
implementing the federal policy favoring arbitration while at the same time trying to effectuate
the parties' intent toward arbitration."); Sherman & Bennett, supranote 24, at B4 (arguing that
"[tihe liberal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements cannot serve as a substitute
for the consent of the parties").
29. See infra Part II.B.1.-II.B.4.
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affilates.3 0
The contract conditioned an affiliate's use of the
31
international firm's trade name upon acceptance of the agreement.
The plaintiff-affiliate never signed the instrument but continued to
use the firm's trade name. 32 When the plaintiff-affiliate sought judicial declaration of its right to use the trade name, the accounting firm
asked the court to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the
agreement.33
The plaintiff argued that since it had never signed the agreement, it was not obligated to arbitrate the dispute. 4 The court prevented the affiliate from avoiding arbitration because the affiliate
never objected to the agreement's terms and knowingly derived a
benefit by using the firm's trade name. 5 The court held that when a
nonsignatory knowingly derives benefit from a written agreement
containing an arbitration provision, that party is estopped from cir6
cumventing contractual obligations by asserting lack of assent.
In applying the traditional doctrine of estoppel, courts consider
general principles of equity and the FAA's underlying policy of promoting arbitration. The extension of an arbitration agreement to a
nonassenting party clearly violates principles of equity. 7 Equity
favors enforcement of arbitration, however, when a party exploits the
advantageous provisions of a contract while refusing to recognize the
validity of an accompanying arbitration clause."8 On the Deloitte
facts, considerations of equity perfectly coincide with considerations of
assent. The affirmative derivation of a benefit from a contract establishes assent to the terms of that contract. Under an estoppel theory,
30. See 9 F.3d 1060, 1061 (2d Cir. 1993).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1061-62.
33. See id at 1062.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1064.
36. See id. The Second Circuit, in Thomson-CSF, S.A v. American Arbitration Ass'n,
labeled the reasoning in Deloitte as an estoppel argument even though the Deloitte court did not
specifically use this language. See 64 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1995).
37. See Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)

(stating that equity will not permit a party to rely on an agreement when it works to their
advantage and repudiate it when it works to their disadvantage).
38.

See id.; see also In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1981)

(holding that a party may not allege a contractual agency relationship for purposes of standing
and deny that relationship for purposes of arbitration); Avila Group, Inc. v. Norma J., 426 F.
Supp. 537, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("To allow [a party] to claim the benefit of the contract and

simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene the purposes
underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act."); Sherman & Bennett, supra note 24, at B4 n.38
("Courts have compelled arbitration in cases when a non-signatory sought to 'have it both ways'

by relying on the contract when it worked to its advantage and repudiating the contract when
the matter came to arbitration.").
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the federal courts may promote public policy favoring arbitration by
enforcing the actual intent of the contracting parties. 39
2. Scope of the Arbitration Clause
In Deloitte, the nonsignatory argued that it never entered into
an agreement with the international firm and therefore did not express an intent to arbitrate with the firm.40 But often it is a signatory
party that attempts to avoid arbitration. Signatory parties frequently
assault the efficacy of an arbitration clause by pleading claims which
allegedly lie outside the scope of the clause. Federal courts, however,
have severely limited the signatory's ability to circumvent an
arbitration clause through artful pleading.
In Tac Travel America Corp. v. World Airways, Inc., the plaintiff executed an agreement with an airline for the use of chartered
flights.41 The contract assigned all contractual disputes to arbitration 42 with a general exception for personal injury claims. 43 The plaintiff brought an action in federal court against the airline alleging
slander when the airline informed passengers that late flights resulted from the plaintiffs mismanagement. 44 The airline sought to
45
compel arbitration of the claim pursuant to the charter contract.
The plaintiff argued that the slander claim fell under a contractual
exception for personal injury claims and, therefore, was not
arbitrable. 46
The court refused to adopt a broad reading of the personal
47
injury exception to include general tort claims such as slander.
Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs allegations of slander
invoked factual issues inherent to a breach of contract claim, not a
tort claim.48 According to the court, the airline's alleged slanderous
communication breached contractual provisions concerning the notifi-

39. See Tepper Realty, 259 F. Supp. at 692. The Tepper Realty court noted: "'Arbitration
agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the
contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract
when it becomes disadvantageous to him.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
40. See DeloitteNoraudit, 9 F.3d at 1064.
41. See 443 F. Supp. 825, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. The contract between the parties provided that "'[alny dispute between the parties
hereto with respect to this agreement ... shall be determined by arbitration.'" Id. at 827.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 826.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 827.
47. See id. at 827-28.
48. See id. at 828.
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cation of delays to passengers. 49 The court held that a party may not
avoid arbitration by casting its claim in tort when the tort claim rests
upon factual circumstances which would give rise to a breach of contract claim.50
A court, therefore, will examine the relationship between the
factual allegations of the claim and the underlying contract to determine whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement. When the factual allegations of the claim generally relate to
the contract, such claims "arise out of' or "arise in connection with"
the contract and are subject to an arbitration provision. 51

49. See id. at 828-29.
50. See id. at 828.
5L See Gregory v. Electro-Mechanical Corp., 83 F.3d 382, 384-86 (11th Cir. 1996). A
minority of circuits have narrowed the scope of arbitration to matters of contract interpretation
and performance when the agreement relegates disputes "arising out of' or "arising under" the
contract to arbitration. See In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961) ("he agreement to arbitrate is limited to such matters [relating to interpretation of the contract and
performance] when it refers to disputes or controversies 'under' or 'arising out of the contract.").
The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of In re Kinoshita in MediterraneanEnterprises,Inc. v.
Ssangyong Corp., and interpreted the language "arising hereunder" to limit the scope of an
arbitration clause to disputes relating to the interpretation and performance of a contract. See
708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled in part by Gregory, 83 F.2d at 382. In Gregory,
the Eleventh Circuit noted that only the Ninth Circuit has followed the Kinoshita opinion. See
83 F.3d at 385. The Gregory court also noted that the Second Circuit itself expressed
disapproval with its own reasoning in Kinoshita but failed to overrule on grounds of reliance.
See id. The Gregory court adopted a broad reading of "arising under," "arising out of," and
"arising in connection with" to include disputes relating to a breach of the underlying contract,
even if the disputes are brought as claims other than breach of contract. See id. at 386; see also
United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960) ("In the
absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think
only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can
prevail.... ."); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Benjamin F. Shaw Co., 706 F.2d 155, 160 (6th Cir.
1983) ("Where a commercial contract contains a broad arbitration provision covering all
controversies arising under the agreement, arbitration is ordered unless the person seeking to
avoid it can show that the particular dispute is expressly excluded."); Sternlight, supra note 18,
at 29 (discussing federal courts' tendency to interpret arbitration provisions broadly); Philip A.
Langford, Recent Decision, Alabama Supreme Court Contravenes the Policy of the Federal
Arbitration Act: Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Lanier, 47 AA. L. REv. 615, 624-32 (1996)
(discussing federal courts' interpretation of such language in arbitration provisions); Scott M.
McKinnis, Note, Enforcing Arbitration with a Nonsignatory: Equitable Estoppel and Defensive
Piercing of the Corporate Veil, 1995 J. DIsP. RESOL. 197, 201 (discussing key cases in which
courts have prevented plaintiffs from recasting their claims in tort to avoid arbitration); Overby,
supra note 28, at 1144-56 (analyzing federal courts' methodologies in determining the scope of
arbitration clauses).
When parties adopt the standard American Arbitration Association provision submitting
"[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [a] contract, or the breach thereof," to
arbitration, those parties have agreed to arbitrate a broad range of disputes. See In re
Kinoshita, 287 F.2d at 953. Even the Kinoshita court, which narrowly construed "arising
under," would attach broad meaning to the standard arbitration clause. See id.; see also
Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that an
arbitration provision covering "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
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This analysis appears to favor a party's assent to arbitrate a
broad range of disputes as opposed to a particular set of conflicts
specifically contemplated by the parties when executing the agreement. 52 Assent to arbitrate a broad range of disputes, however, does
not necessarily signify assent to arbitrate those disputes with nonsignatories. Even if a party agreed to arbitrate a range of disputes arising under a contract, that party might reasonably argue that it specifically agreed to arbitrate those disputes only with other contracting
parties.
In Lawson Fabrics,Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., the plaintiff sued the
defendant yarn company for delivery of mislabeled and defective
textiles.5 3 The plaintiffs claims against the textile company were
clearly arbitrable under the sales agreement between the parties,5
but the plaintiff also brought an action against the textile company's
parent corporation for inducement of fraud and conspiracy to commit
fraud.5 The parent company was not a party to the sales agreement
but nevertheless sought to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs claims
under the contract. The plaintiff, of course, argued that it was under
56
no obligation to arbitrate with a nonparty.
In compelling arbitration of the claims, the court focused on
the plaintiffs intent to arbitrate claims arising out of the underlying
contract. 57 The court noted the plaintiffs general agreement to arbitrate all contractual disputes. 58 The court, however, did not address
the plaintiffs intent, or lack thereof, to arbitrate with nonparties.
Instead, the court perceived the nonsignatory defendant as a threat to
federal policy in favor of arbitration. In essence, the plaintiff at-

Agreement or the breach thereof... cover[ed] contract-generated or contract-related disputes
between the parties however labeled").
The standard arbitration provision recommended by the American Arbitration Association
states that: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach
thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association."
AMERICAN ARITRATION ASSOCIATION, DRAFTING DISPuTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES, A PRACTiCAL
GUIDE 5 (1996).

52. See Langford, supra note 51, at 64142 (arguing that when parties have drafted a general arbitration provision, assent should attach to disputes arising out of the container agreement and that parties should bear the burden of explicitly removing disputes from the scope of
arbitration); Overby, supra note 28, at 1152 (noting that the "current federal approaches to
arbitrability require careful drafting" and that "[ulse of a broad arbitration clause will usually
prompt a court to compel arbitration when a dispute arises, if that dispute has any relationship
with the subject matter of the arbitration clause").
53. 355 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without opinion,486 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1973).
54. See id. at 1149.
55. See id. at 1148.
56. See id. at 1151.
57. See id. at 1148-49.
58. See id. at 1148.
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tempted to litigate issues against the defendant's owner while the
plaintiff simultaneously arbitrated those same issues against the
defendant. The court stated that a resolution of the claims against
the defendant in arbitration necessitated at least partial resolution of
the judicial claims against the defendant's corporate owner. 59 The
court recognized that allowing the plaintiff to file its claims against
the nonsignatory parent would in essence rejuvenate the judicial
forum for those claims originally subject to arbitration with the
signatory textile company. 60 The court simply refused to defeat an
arbitration clause upon the appearance of a nonsignatory defendant. 61
Artful circumnavigation of arbitration through the addition of a new
62
defendant would undermine federal policy.

The Lawson court prevented the plaintiff from filing otherwise
arbitrable claims in court against a nonsignatory defendant. 63 The
court justified the decision as a means of protecting a federal policy in
favor of arbitration." The court thereby thwarted an attack on the
underlying policy of the FAA by refusing to allow a plaintiff with
unacceptable motives to avoid an arbitration provision. Intuition
supports the Lawson court's argument that the plaintiff cannot dodge

arbitration by adding a nonsignatory defendant to the complaint. But
the court never squarely addressed the fact that the plaintiff had not
entered into an arbitration with the parent company. In essence, the
court deflected an assault on the FAA but failed to develop a theory to
deal consistently with nonsignatories in the future.
3. The Transactional Test: Precursor to Equitable Estoppel
Other courts have defended the FAA and federal policy against
similar attacks by formulating specific tests applicable to nonsignatories. In Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, an import company acted as sales representative for the subsidiary of a Belgian
corporation. 65 When the subsidiary terminated the sales agreement,
59. See id60. See id. at 1151.
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also Kroll v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 3 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a plaintiff may be forced to arbitrate with a nonparty when the plaintiff files a
claim originally subject to arbitration against a nonparty liable for the arbitrating party's acts);
Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 369 n.2 (1st Cir. 1968) ("If arbitration defenses could be
foreclosed simply by adding as a defendant a person not a party to an arbitration agreement, the
utility of such agreements would be seriously compromised.").
63. See Lawson Fabrics,355 F. Supp. at 1151.
64. See id.
65. See 530 F.2d 679, 680(5th Cir. 1976).
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the import company brought an action against both the subsidiary
and the nonsignatory parent corporation. 66 The district court stayed
the import company's claims (except the alleged antitrust violations)
against both the parent and subsidiary pending arbitration, pursuant
to the underlying agreement. 67 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision
as a proper use of the lower court's discretion and held that a plaintiffs claims against a parent nonsignatory are arbitrable when the
claims against the parent and subsidiary arise from the same operative facts and when the claims are inherently inseparable. 68
The "transactional" test adopted by the Fifth Circuit identifies
a claim against a nonsignatory that is constructively identical to a
claim against the signatory. The test identifies attempts to avoid
arbitration through the addition of a nonsignatory to the litigation. In
essence, the test formalizes the Lawson court's concern with the artful
circumnavigation of arbitration agreements, but, at its core, the test
preserves the idea that a party is not subject to arbitration when that
party has not assented to arbitration as the forum for the resolution
of the dispute.6 9 When the claim against the signatory (subsidiary) is
identical to the claim against the nonsignatory (parent), the intent to
arbitrate the first claim clearly transfers to the second party. The
parent and the subsidiary, therefore, are the same party for purposes
of arbitration.
4. The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
a. Equitable Estoppel as Proxy of Signatory's Intent to
Arbitrate: An Examination of the Signatory's Claims Against
the Nonsignatory
The transactional test alone cannot adapt to varied fact patterns featuring a more generic nonsignatory. The test is limited to
fact patterns involving a plaintiff suing the nonsignatory parent of a

66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.; see also J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315,
320-21 (4th Cir. 1988) ("When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are
based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the
parent to arbitration even though the parent is not formally a party to the arbitration
agreement.").
69. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (stating,
in the context of collective bargaining agreements, that a party will not be compelled to
arbitrate any dispute which he has not agreed to submit to arbitration).
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signatory subsidiary. 70 The doctrine of equitable estoppel, however,
can extend beyond the parent/subsidiary context to address more
71
general relationships between signatories and nonsignatories.
In Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County School
Building Corp., the court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
circumstances distinct from the parent/subsidiary context. 72 The
plaintiff ("Hughes") contracted with the defendant school system
("Clark") to provide masonry services for the construction of school
facilities. 73 The contract between the plaintiff and the school system
designated a third party ("J.A.") as construction manager for the project.74 J.A., however, provided management services under a separate
contractual relationship with the Clark County school system. 75 In
addition, Hughes never entered into an independent agreement with
J.A.76

The Clark County school system later terminated Hughes's
services and commenced arbitration pursuant to the contract to recover the expense of securing replacement masonry services. 77 In
response, Hughes filed claims against both the Clark County school
system and J.A. in federal court. 78 J.A. moved to compel arbitration
between all parties despite the lack of an agreement between itself
and Hughes. 79 The district court denied the motion, and J.A. appealed.80
On appeal, Hughes disputed J.A.'s standing to invoke the arbitration clause in the agreement between itself and the school system
because J.A., as construction manager, was never a party to that
agreement.8 ' Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Hughes was equitably estopped from contesting the nonsigna-

70.

See supranotes 65-68 and accompanying text.

71.

Of course, equitable estoppel itself can also be applied to the parent/subsidiary

context. See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
72. See 659 F.2d 836,841 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. See id at 837.

74.

See id.

Clark County contracted directly with James Associates, who then had

authority to assign project managers. James Associates designated J.A. (a separate entity) as
project manager. See id.

75. See id.
76. See id. at 837-41. Hughes and J.A. operated under separate contracts with Clark. See
id. at 837.
77. See id. at 837-38.
78. Hughes first filed an action against the manager in state court and later amended the
federal claim to add J.A. as a defendant. See id. at 838.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81.

See id.
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tory's standing to invoke the arbitration provision.82 The court first
analyzed the relationship between Hughes's complaint against J.A.
(for intentional and negligent interference with contract) and the
underlying contract between Hughes and the school system
containing the arbitration provision.8 The court found that Hughes's
complaint essentially alleged the construction manager's failure to
perform certain obligations assigned it by the underlying agreement
between Hughes and the school system.8 The court reasoned that the
complaint relied upon the existence of that agreement.
According to the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, equitable estoppel essentially assesses the proximity between a signatory's claims
and a contract containing the arbitration provision.8 6 Sufficient proximity triggers a finding that such claim is "intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract."87 This finding kequires
that the claims arise from the contract and fall within the scope of the
arbitration provision.88
Because Hughes, the plaintiff-signatory, assented to the original arbitration provision, Hughes constructively assented to arbitrate
the full range of disputes arising under the contract. 9 The court
82. See id. at 838-40.
83. See id. at 838-39.
84. See id. The Hughes-Clark contract provided that J.A. was to handle the following.
[Tihe scheduling and coordination of Hughes' work on the project, the processing of
Hughes' payment applications and the certification of Hughes' work for payment by
Clark. The Hughes-Clark agreement also [gave] JA the authority to approve original
and revised work progress schedules prepared by Hughes, to approve Hughes'
operations on the project sites and to determine whether materials and equipment used
by Hughes [were] defective.
Id. at 839.
85. See id. at 840-41. The court ultimately found that the plaintiffs claims were
"intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations" set forth in
that agreement. Id. at 841 n.9.
86. See id. at 838 (stating that Hughes was equitably estopped from asserting a claim because the basis of his claim against JA was that J.A. breached the duties assigned to J. by
the agreement between Clark and Hughes).
87. Id. at 841 n.9.
88. In Carlin v. 3V Inc., the Texas Court of Appeals analyzed federal equitable estoppel
cases and concluded that the "focus of the inquiry in each of these cases was on the nature of the
underlying claims asserted by the party resisting arbitration and to determine whether these
claims were within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement." 928 S.W.2d
291, 296 (Tex. App. 1996).
89. The Hughes court invoked the traditional estoppel doctrine to achieve the same result.
The plaintiff implicitly conceded that the contract containing the arbitration provision governed
the relationship between itself and the construction manager because the plaintiff derived a
benefit from the contract in suing the construction manager. See Hughes Masonry, 659 F.2d at
839. The court stated that:
[Ut would be manifestly inequitable to permit [the plaintiff] to both claim that [the
construction manager] is liable to [the plaintiff] for its failure to perform the contractual
duties described in the [underlying] agreement and at the same time deny that [the
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implied that once the assent of a party attaches to a range of disputes,
whether the plaintiff-signatory intended to arbitrate a dispute with a
particular party is irrelevant. 9° Equitable estoppel constructively
establishes an intent to arbitrate with nonsignatories.
The Second Circuit's analysis of equitable estoppel in
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Association emphasized
the analytical importance of assent in determining the proper
application of the federal doctrine. 91 In Thomson-CSF, the Thomson
92
corporation acquired a flight simulator company as a subsidiary.
The subsidiary had agreed previously to buy its computer equipment
from Evans and Sutherland Computer Corporation ("E & S").93 The
working agreement between the subsidiary and E & S contained an
arbitration clause. 94 When the subsidiary's purchases dropped due to
a decrease in Thomson's flight simulator market share, E & S
commenced arbitration proceedings against both the subsidiary and
Thomson for breach of the working agreement.9 5 Thomson, however,
96
never adopted or became a party to the original working agreement.
The court implicitly conceded that a literal application of equitable estoppel could potentially force Thomson to arbitrate the dispute
with E & S.97 The court noted that E & S's claims arguably arose under the working agreement.9 8 The court, however, held that applying
equitable estoppel on these facts would completely undermine the use
of the doctrine as a proxy for assent: The nonsignatory Thomson cor-

construction manager] is a party to that agreement in order to avoid arbitration of
claims clearly within the ambit of the arbitration clause.
Id. at 838-39.
90.

The plaintiffs attempt to recast the claim in tort was ineffectual because artful

pleading will not change the fundamental relationship between a claim and the underlying
contract.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 840-41 & n.9.
See 64 F.3d 773, 778-80 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 775.
See id.
See id. at 776.

95. See id.
96. See id. at 775.
97. See id at 778-79.
98. See id. The court noted E & S's argument that its claims against Thomson were
closely associated with the working agreement. See id. (The court, however, later found that E
& S's claims against Thomson were not integrally related to the underlying contract. See id. at
779-80.) In addition, Thomson and its subsidiary clearly existed as a part of the same
management structure and in effect constituted a single party. See id. (stating that the "district
court ... found that the management of [Thomson's subsidiary] and Thomson were closely
related"). Part ILB.4.b of this Note discusses the importance of a close relationship between
signatory and nonsignatory parties and will argue that such relationships favor arbitration.
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poration never demonstrated a willingness to arbitrate anything with
99
anyone.
Hughes and Thomson-CSF differ in one crucial aspect. In
Hughes, the plaintiff was a party to the underlying contract and
sought to avoid operation of the applicable arbitration provision.
Thomson-CSF, however, demonstrated the reverse paradigm. In
Thomson-CSF, the plaintiff (an original signatory) sought to expand
the scope of the arbitration agreement to include a nonsignatory
(Thomson) who had never attached its assent to an arbitration provision.
Equitable estoppel proceeds from the starting point of
assent. 1°° In Hughes, the signatory plaintiff brought an action against
a nonsignatory construction manager. Those claims arose from and
depended on the contract containing the arbitration agreement.'0 '
The doctrine of equitable estoppel established the plaintiffs assent to
a range of disputes arising out of that contract. Equitable estoppel,
however, may not operate to define the parameters of Thomson's
assent because Thomson never assented to arbitration. 10 2 Because
Thomson never assented to arbitration, equitable estoppel cannot
function to construct the range of that assent. 0 3
When a nonsignatory resists arbitration, courts may not use
contract principles to infer intent when none existed in the first
place.'04 But when a signatory resists arbitration, courts may use
equitable estoppel to join a "willing" nonsignatory to a proceeding
where arbitration between the underlying signatory participants is
appropriate. 10 5 Some courts, however, have stretched the boundaries
99.

See id. at 779 ("At no point did Thomson indicate a willingness to arbitrate with E &

S.").
100. But see infra note 106 for a discussion of Dunn Construction Co. v. Sugar Beach
Condominium Ass'n, 760 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ala. 1991), in which the court seemingly contravened this principle.
101. See Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 83941 (7th Cir. 1981).
102. See Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779; see also Sherman & Bennett, supra note 24, at B4
(discussing the importance of assent to the equitable estoppel analysis in Thomson-CSF).
103. "Thomson ...cannot be estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration clause
to which it is a signatory because no such clause exists. At no point did Thomson indicate a
willingness to arbitrate with E & S." Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779.
104. See Ex parte Isbell, No. CV-95-8362, 1997 WL 679418, at *15 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997)
(Hooper, C.J., dissenting) ("If the case involved a signatory's attempting to compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate, it would be clear that the nonsignatory did not agree to the arbitration.");
Sherman & Bennett, supranote 24, at B4 (arguing that a "liberal policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements cannot serve as a substitute for the consent of the parties").
105. See Sherman & Bennett, supra note 24, at B4 ("Recent extensions of the conventional
theories recognize that when arbitration between signatories is appropriate and a non-signatory
seeks to join the arbitration, consent may be more easily found.").
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of federal principles. 1' 6 In adopting the theory of equitable estoppel in
McBro Planning & Development Co. v. Triangle Electrical
Construction Co., the Eleventh Circuit applied the doctrine in contravention of the express intent of the contracting parties. 0 7 The expansion of equitable estoppel in McBro corresponds with the McBro
court's expansion of the test itself.
The next section explicates McBro's analysis and its transformation of equitable estoppel into a two-pronged test. The preceding
discussion has defined the first prong of equitable estoppel as a comparison between signatory's complaint and the underlying contract
containing the arbitration provision. The McBro court initiates the
development of a second prong 0 8 by examining the specific
relationships between signatory and nonsignatory parties.
The
following discussion elucidates this nexus prong and argues that a
close relationship between signatory and nonsignatory entities favors
arbitration.
b. The Nexus Prong: Examination of the RelationshipBetween
Signatoryand Nonsignatory Entities
In McBro, the plaintiff-electrical contractor ("Triangle") agreed
to perform work for St. Margaret's Hospital.109 A development company ("McBro") entered into a separate contract with St. Margaret's
Hospital to serve as construction manager for the hospital building
106. It appears that some courts simply misapply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In
Dunn Construction Co. v. Sugar Beach Condominium Ass'n, a developer contracted with a
construction company to build condominiums. See 760 F. Supp. 1479, 1480 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
The contract between the developer and the construction company contained an arbitration
provision. As part of the transaction, a separate insurance company issued a completion bond
incorporating the original contract by reference. A bank financed the construction project and
received a mortgage on the property. The bank eventually foreclosed on a part of the property,
expended two million dollars to make repairs, and sued the construction company for breach of
contract and negligence. See id. at 1481. The construction company sought to compel
arbitration of the dispute according to the terms of the contract between the construction
company and the developer. See id. at 1483. Because the bank's claims were founded on the
contract and because of the bank's close relationship with signatory parties, the court held that
the bank was equitably estopped from asserting the lack of a written arbitration agreement as a
defense to arbitration. See id. at 1484. Therefore, a signatory was able to expand the scope of
an arbitration agreement to include a nonsignatory when the nonsignatory never agreed to
arbitrate its disputes with the construction company.
107. See 741 F.2d 342, 343-44 (11th Cir. 1984).
108. The following section examines the Eleventh Circuit's development of the nexus prong
as an implicit element of equitable estoppel emerging in McBro and subsequently in Sunkist
Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit
does not use the dual prong terminology. This Note uses first and second prong as convenient
references to this Author's perception of discrete elements of equitable estoppel.
109. See McBro, 741 F.2d at 342-43.
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project. 110 Triangle and McBro entered into separateand independent
contracts with St. Margaret's. Both contracts with the hospital contained arbitration provisions."' Although the agreement between
Triangle and St. Margaret's acknowledged McBro as construction
manager,"2 the agreement expressly disavowed "'any contractual
relationship between.., the Construction Manager and the [plaintiff]

Contractor.'

"113

Despite its overt waiver of a contractual relationship with
McBro, the district court compelled Triangle to arbitrate its claims
with the construction manager."4 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel to affirm the district court's decision." 5 The court found that Triangle's complaint
essentially alleged that McBro breached the duties assigned it by the
underlying agreement between Triangle and St. Margaret's

Hospital."6

The court did not stop with this first prong of the equitable
estoppel test. The court proceeded beyond an analysis of the complaint and underlying contract to examine the nexus between the
parties. The court found that the close relationship between the three
17
entities favored arbitration.
In Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., the
Eleventh Circuit solidified the second prong of its test. 18 In this case,
Sunkist Growers owned a soft drink label and granted Sunkist Soft
Drinks ("SSD") a license to market the brand name. 119 The licensing
arrangement contained a provision submitting "'controvers[ies] or
claim[s] arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach
thereof... [to] arbitration.' "120
The Del Monte corporation later acquired SSD as a new sub121
sidiary and eliminated SSD as an independent operating entity.
Subsequently, a dispute arose between Sunkist Growers and Del

110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 343 (quoting the agreement).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 344.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 343.
118. See 10 F.3d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1993) (examining the nexus between the parties and
concluding that the claims were "intimately founded in and intertwined with the agreement at
issue, such that Sunkist was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration of the claims").
119. See id. at 755.
120. Id.
121. See id.
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Monte relating to the subsidiary's performance of the licensing
agreement. 122 Sunkist Growers alleged that Del Monte's management
caused the subsidiary to breach the licensing agreement. 123 Del Monte
filed an action against Sunkist Growers seeking judicial declaration
that Sunkist Growers' claims against Del Monte were subject to arbi24
tration under the terms of the licensing agreement.1
Sunkist Growers argued that the absence of a written agreement between itself and Del Monte precluded arbitration of its claims
The court held that Sunkist
against the parent corporation.'2
Growers was equitably estopped from asserting the lack of a written
agreement with nonsignatory Del Monte as a bar to arbitration. 26 In
applying the first prong of the equitable estoppel test, the court found
that Sunkist Growers' claim essentially alleged that Del Monte's
management and reorganization of the new subsidiary resulted in the
subsidiary's failure to perform under the licensing agreement. 27 The
factual allegations of the complaint depended upon the existence of
the licensing agreement that contained the arbitration clause.M
But the complaint's reliance solely upon the existence of the
licensing agreement does not necessarily mean that the complaint
itself arises from that agreement. Indeed, the Sunkist court stated
that the licensing agreement did not assign the nonsignatory Del
Monte specific duties and obligations. 29 Rather, Del Monte suffered
potential liability because it merely interfered with the licensing
agreement containing the arbitration provision. 30 The dispute between Sunkist Growers and Del Monte, therefore, arose from the
licensing agreement in the sense that the dispute simply could not
3
exist without the agreement itself.' '

122. See id. at 755, 758.
123. See id. at 758.
124. See id. at 755.
125. See id. at 757-58.
126. See id. at 758.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 757 ("The license agreement at issue here does not specify or make mention
of any duties or obligations that Del Monte owes to Sunkist.").
130. See id. at 758 ("Essentially, Sunkist contends that Del Monte, through its
management and operation of SSD, caused SSD to violate various terms and provisions of the
license agreement.").
131. See id. ("Although Sunkist does not rely exclusively on the license agreement to
support its claims, each claim presumes the existence of such an agreement.").
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But in McBro, the underlying contract specifically referenced
the nonsignatory's duties and obligations.12 The nonsignatory suffered potential liability when it allegedly breached the obligations set
forth in the contract containing the arbitration provision. 13 The connection between complaint and contract in Sunkist was much weaker
than in McBro.
For this reason the nexus prong of the equitable estoppel
analysis became crucial in Sunkist. In applying the second prong, the
Sunkist court examined the close relationship between Del Monte and
its subsidiary and concluded that the subsidiary had for all practical
purposes ceased to exist within Del Monte's management structure.13 4
Therefore, the tight relationship between Del Monte and its subsidiary favored arbitration of Sunkist Growers' claims against Del Monte,
the nonsignatory parent corporation. 1 s
132. See McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th
Cir. 1994).
133. See id.
134. See Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 758.
135. See id. The court's application of the nexus test resembles the traditional analysis of
corporate veil piercing. In the context of arbitration, plaintiffs will often attempt to pierce the
veil of a signatory subsidiary to reach and enforce arbitration against a parent nonsignatory
corporation. See McKinnis, supra note 51, at 205. Traditionally, courts will only pierce the
corporate veil when the parent dominates the subsidiary to the extent of eliminating the subsidiary's separate existence. See id. ("The level of parental control necessary to invoke the
instrumentality rule does not require complete stock control, but rather such domination as to
effectively leave the subsidiary corporation with no mind of its own .... ."); see also ThomsonCSF, SA. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A] parent company
and its subsidiary lose their distinct corporate identities when their conduct demonstrates a
virtual abandonment of separateness.").
Some courts refuse to pierce the corporate veil on the basis of control alone. Rather, the
court must find the use of control and domination to perpetuate fraud. See Fisser v.
International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that fraud must accompany a
finding of control to justify piercing the corporate veil); Keystone Shipping Co. v. Texport Oil
Co., 782 F. Supp. 28, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (establishing a presumption of separateness in the
absence of fraud). However, one commentator has noted that some courts do not impose the
fraud requirement. See McKinnis, supra note 51, at 205; see also Farkar Co. v. R.A. Hanson
DISC., Ltd., 441 F. Supp. 841, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (suggesting that abandonment of separate
identities results in probable fraud), modified, 583 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1978).
Under a veil-piercing analysis, the relationship between parent and subsidiary is so close
that the two entities become one for the purpose of arbitration. See McKinnis, supra note 51, at
205 (stating that piercing the corporate veil is appropriate if the level of parental control has
risen to such a point that the "subsidiary corporation [has] no mind of its own, thereby merely
acting as a conduit for its parent company"). Therefore, a party may be forced to arbitrate a
claim against a parent corporation despite the lack of any agreement when that party has
entered into a contract with the subsidiary containing an arbitration provision. The party has
thereby agreed to arbitrate with an "entity," which includes both parent and subsidiary. In
essence, the party's intent to arbitrate with a subsidiary functions as an intent to arbitrate with
the parent.
If the nexus test were merely a remnant of veil piercing, the test would potentially serve to
protect the "intent" of contracting parties in a parent-subsidiary context or in appropriate
piercing scenarios. But the McBro case demonstrated that the nexus test extends beyond a
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5. Nexus Prong Threatens to Subvert Intent of the
Contracting Parties
The nexus prong of equitable estoppel threatens to privilege
transactional relationships over contractual manifestations of assent.
To equitably estop a party from resisting arbitration with a nonsignatory, a court must initially find a close connection between a party's
claims against the nonsignatory and the underlying contract containing an arbitration provision. 13 6 A party that assents to arbitrate
claims arising out of a contract also assents to arbitrate those claims
against a nonsignatory when the fundamental dispute is "intimately
founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations." 1 7 However, Sunkist and McBro together suggest that equitable estoppel will not automatically fail when the relationship between
a party's claims and the underlying contract grows thin. Indeed, a
close nexus between all of the relevant parties may support arbitration even when the connection between the claim and the complaint is
weak. 138 Therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel threatens to
enforce arbitration against the intent of contracting parties.
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND THE ALABAMA COURTS

A. Alabama'sHostility to Arbitration
Traditionally, Alabama courts have adhered to a public policy
against arbitration and have prohibited the enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements. 31 9
The Alabama Supreme Court has
piercing analysis. In MeBro, the court turned the nexus test into a broader transactional test.
See McBro, 741 F.2d at 343-44 (finding that the "close relationship of the... entities" involved
and the "close relationship of the alleged wrongs" to the nonsignatory's duties compelled arbitration of the plaintiffs claims). The participation of several parties in one transaction favored
the arbitration of all claims. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
136. See supraPart II.B.4.a.
137. See Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 841
n.9 (7th Cir. 1981).
138. See supra notes 117, 132-35 and accompanying text.
139. See H.L. Fuller Constr. Co. v. Industrial Dev. Bd., 590 So. 2d 218, 221 (Ala. 1991);
Stanley D. Bynum & J. David Pugh, EnforcingArbitrationAgreements in Alabama: A Double
StandardDilemma, 54 ALA. LAw. 38, 39-40 (1993); Henry C. Strickland, Allied-Bruce Terminix,
Inc. v. Dobson.: Widespread Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA.
LAW. 238, 238-39 (1995); Henry C. Strickland et al., ModernArbitrationfor Alabama: A Concept
Whose Time Has Come, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 59, 60-63 (1994); Donald E. Johnson, Recent Decision,
Has Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson ExterminatedAlabama's Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47
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explained the hostility as deference to judicial sovereignty: Individual
parties should not be able to displace the jurisdiction of the courts
through private agreements. 140 At the same time, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as a congressional effort to
overturn common law hostility to arbitration.'4 ' Nevertheless, the
Alabama Supreme Court initially preserved state policy against
arbitration agreements by holding the FAA inapplicable in state
courts.

42

The court reasoned that Congress had passed the FAA to

enforce arbitration provisions in federal, not state, courts."'3
Shortly thereafter, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Supreme
Court held that the FAA was applicable in state as well as federal
courts.'" This decision prevented the Alabama judiciary from prohibiting the enforcement of the FAA in state courts, 45 but the decision
did not immediately reverse Alabama's anti-arbitration policy.
A contract containing an arbitration provision must still involve interstate commerce to fall within the scope of the FAA.146 The
Alabama Supreme Court originally limited the applicability of the
FAA in state court by holding that a contract involves interstate
commerce only when the contracting parties substantially contemplated interstate commerce at the time of execution. 47 The test

ALA. L. REV. 577, 579-82 (1996); Langford, supranote 51, at 615-16. In addition to common law

hostility, Alabama statutory law impedes the enforcement of arbitration provisions: "he
following obligations cannot be specifically enforced: ... (3) An agreement to submit a
controversy to arbitration...." ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court has
enforced Alabama code section 8-1-41(3) to prohibit judicial enforcement of a predispute
arbitration agreement. See H.L. Fuller,590 So.2d at 221.
140. See H.L. Fuller,590 So. 2d at 221; Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, 387 So. 2d
140, 144 (Ala. 1980).
141. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985) ("The House
Report accompanying the Act makes clear that its purpose was.., to overrule the judiciary's
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate."); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (finding that the FAA
was designed to "revers[e] ... centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements"); see also
supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
142. See Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Co., 433 So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Ala. 1983), vacated and
remandedfor further consideration,465 U.S. 1016, 1016 (1984).
143. See id. at 1161-62.
144. 465 U.S. at 16; Johnson, supra note 139, at 586-87.
145. See Johnson, supra note 139, at 586.
146. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-11 (stating that
arbitration provisions must be part of a contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce"
to be enforceable under the FAA).
147. See Ex parte Jones, 628 So. 2d 316, 318 (Ala. 1993) (holding that a contract involves
interstate commerce when "'at the time [the parties] entered into [the contract] and accepted
the arbitration clause, they contemplated substantial interstate activity' ") (quoting Ex parte
Warren, 548 So. 2d 157, 160 (Ala. 1989)). See Strickland et al., supra note 139, at 66-73, for a
detailed history of the Alabama Supreme Court's development of the substantial contemplation
of interstate commerce test.
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essentially presumed that a contract fell outside the scope of the
FAA.148 The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the
"substantial contemplation" test in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson and held that the FAA was enforceable to the full extent of
Congress's commerce clause powers. 49
The Allied-Bruce decision did not completely eliminate the
Alabama courts' ability to resist arbitration. To compel arbitration of
a dispute, a court must still find the dispute arbitrable under the
terms of the relevant agreement. An aversion to arbitration compels
a narrow reading of arbitration provisions. A refusal to extend the
scope of arbitration provisions beyond signatory parties reduces the
breadth and efficacy of arbitration agreements. A nonsignatory's
attempt to compel arbitration is in essence an attempt to stretch the
scope of such agreements. A court's acceptance of the nonsignatory
corresponds with that court's willingness to expand the parameters of
the arbitration clause.150
B. Scope of the ArbitrationClause
Federal law prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause
against one who has not agreed to arbitrate. 51 Federal policy, how52
ever, favors an expansive reading of arbitration provisions.
Accordingly, in interpreting a contract provision which submits all
disputes "arising out of' the contract to arbitration, a majority of
federal circuits have found that such language covers nearly every
dispute relating to a breach of the underlying contract. 53 The
Supreme Court, in fact, has directed lower courts to resolve ambiguities concerning the scope of an arbitration provision in favor of enforcement of the clause.M Therefore, the contracting parties' intent to
arbitrate attaches to a broad range of disputes arising out of the contract containing the provision.

148. See Johnson, supra note 139, at 592.
149. See 513 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1995); Johnson, supra note 139, at 595-96.

150. See Patricia J. Ponder, Alabama's Arbitration Cases: Where Does the Non-Signatory
Stand?, 58 ALA. LAW. 246, 246 (1997). Ponder notes that: "[Q]uestions still remain regarding
how broadly an Alabama court will construe an arbitration provision. The particular imbroglio
engaging the Alabama Supreme Court at this moment is whether a non-signatory to a contract
containing an arbitration provision may compel arbitration pursuant to that clause." Id.
151. See supranotes 21, 27 and accompanying text.
152. See supranotes 17-20 and accompanying text; see also McKinnis, supra note 51, at 200
(discussing the federal policy in support of a broad reading of arbitration provisions).
153. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
154. See Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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The Alabama Supreme Court, however, constructs the range of
arbitrable disputes "arising out of a contract" according to a narrow
vision of intent. In Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Lanier, an insurance agent brought claims against an insurance company alleging
breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, conversion, and interference with business relations. 5s Three separate contracts between the
parties contained provisions calling for the arbitration of any disputes
"arising out of' the agreements. 5 6 Although the court acknowledged
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, 157 it narrowed the
scope of "arising out of' to matters of contract interpretation and
performance.158 Applying the narrow reading of the provisions, the
court held that the conversion and interference with business relationships claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration provisions. 59
The Alabama Supreme Court's resistance to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel arises from its analytical focus on the intent of contracting
parties to arbitrate.
C. The Alabama Supreme Court'sApproach to Nonsignatories
1. Analytical Focus on Intent
The Alabama Supreme Court has on rare occasion allowed a
nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration agreement."" The court, however, has traditionally refused to apply equitable estoppel in doing
so. 16
Instead, the court attempts to determine whether the arbitra155. See 644 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Ala. 1994).
156. See id. at 1260.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1261-62; see also Langford, supra note 51, at 638-39 (discussing the inconsistency between the Alabama Supreme Court's citation of the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration and the court's narrow reading of the arbitration provisions). In Lanier, the
Alabama Supreme Court followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in MediterraneanEnterprisesv.

Ssangyong Corp., whereby the Ninth Circuit found that terminology such as "arising out of" and
"arising hereunder" merely qualified disputes involving contract performance and interpretation. See id. at 1261-62 (citing Mediterranean Enters. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464
(9th Cir. 1983)); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.

159. See Lanier, 644 So. 2d at 1263; see also Michael L. Bell, Fraud and Insurance
Companies in Alabama, in AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY:

CONFERENCE ON LIFE INSURANCE LITIGATION 267, 278 (1997) (listing cases,

including Lanier, which have narrowly construed the scope of similar arbitration provisions).

160. See, e.g., Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (allowing a nonsignatory
manufacturer to compel arbitration of purchaser's claims pursuant to buyer-vendor agreement).
161. See id. at 373-75 (failing to invoke equitable estoppel in allowing a nonsignatory
manufacturer to compel arbitration); Bell, supranote 159, at 279 (The Alabama Supreme Court
has declined to follow the body of substantive law [i.e., equitable estoppel] applied in the
Eleventh Circuit.").
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tion provision is broad enough to include plaintiffs claims against the
nonsignatory.162 The breadth of the arbitration provision corresponds
to the court's determination of the contracting parties' subjective
intent to arbitrate.163 The court determines intent by interpreting the
language of the relevant arbitration provision itself.164

In Ex parte Jones, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with
a lender to borrow money for the purchase of an automobile. 165 As
part of the loan, the lender financed a collateral insurance policy
issued by a separate insurance carrier to cover the automobile.166
Although the loans provided funds for the policy, the policy represented an independent and separate agreement between the plaintiff
and the insurance company. 167 When the car was destroyed and the
plaintiff attempted to recover on the policy, the insurance company
did not pay the entire amount of the plaintiffs claim.168 Thereafter,

the plaintiff brought an action against both the insurance company
and the lender alleging fraud and bad faith. 169
The loan arrangement between the plaintiff and the lender
contained an arbitration clause, while the separate insurance contract
between plaintiff and carrier did not. 70 Nevertheless, the trial court
compelled arbitration of the plaintiffs claims against both the lender
and the nonsignatory insurance carrier pursuant to the terms of the
loan contract.'7 ' On appeal, the plaintiff conceded the appropriateness of arbitration with the lender but cited an absence of any agreement to arbitrate disputes with the nonsignatory insurance company 7 2

162. See Bell, supra note 159, at 279 ("[T]he Court has permitted nonsignatories to compel
arbitration when it has determined that the scope of the arbitration provision at issue is broad
enough to include the claims asserted against the nonsignatory.").
163. See Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Ala. 1996) (asking whether the trial court
properly compelled arbitration and finding that the instant court "must use general principles of
contract interpretation to answer this question" and that "[iun interpreting the arbitration
clause found in the loan contract, [the court] must consider the intent of the parties to that
contract"); Gates, 675 So. 2d at 374 (asking whether the trial court properly compelled arbitration and finding that the "answer to that question is a matter of contract interpretation, which
is guided by considering the intent of the parties to the.., contract").
164. See supra note 163.
165. See Jones, 686 So. 2d at 1166-67.
166. See id. at 1167.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.

746

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:721

The Alabama Supreme Court sought to determine whether the
arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the lender was broad
enough to include the plaintiffs claims against the nonsignatory insurance carrier.'73 The court recited the familiar federal policy in
favor of arbitration, but simultaneously noted the importance of determining the actual intent of the contracting parties.'71 4
The court struck the balance between the expansive federal
arbitration policy and the apparent intent of the plaintiff not to arbitrate with the nonsignatory insurance carrier by engaging in a narrow
analysis of intent. The court essentially asked whether the plaintiff
intended to arbitrate its current claims against the insurance carrier
when it entered into the loan agreement. 7 5 The court found that the
loan arrangement demonstrated a specific intent by the plaintiff to
enter into a creditor-debtor relationship, and therefore the arbitration
provision extended only to disputes between the lender and the plaintiff.' 6 The court held that the plaintiffs claims against the insurance
177
carrier were not subject to arbitration.

173. See id. at 1167-68; see also supranotes 161-63 and accompanying text.
174. See Jones, 686 So. 2d at 1167. The court stated: "In interpreting the arbitration
clause found in the loan contract, we must consider the intent of the parties to that
contract...." Id. (emphasis added).
175. See id. at 1167-68. The court adopted a similar approach in PrudentialSecurities, Inc.
v. Micro-Fab, Inc., 689 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1997). In that case, an individual opened an account
with Prudential Securities and purchased certain Prudential investment products. See id. at
830. The individual entered into a client agreement containing an arbitration provision. The
individual, who was also the sole shareholder and president of Micro-Fab, caused the
corporation to open a separate investment account with Prudential and buy the same investment products. However, Micro-Fab never agreed to arbitrate future disputes with Prudential
Securities. When Micro-Fab later sued Prudential, alleging fraud in connection with the sale of
securities, Prudential sought to compel Micro-Fab to arbitrate its claims pursuant to the
original client agreement. See id. The court held that the language of the client agreement did
not manifest an intent to encompass a future relationship between Micro-Fab and Prudential.
See id. at 831. Therefore, Micro-Fab's claims against Prudential were not subject to arbitration.
See id. at 831-32.
176. See Jones, 686 So. 2d at 1167-68. The court engaged in an analysis of the plaintiffs intentions and found "no mutual agreement to submit to arbitration the issues between the
[plaintiff] and [the insurance company]." Id. at 1168.
177. See id. at 1168. Justice Maddox dissented from the majority opinion and applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to produce a different result. See id. at 1168-71 (Maddox, J.,
dissenting). Justice Maddox recited the two elements of the equitable estoppel doctrine. First,
the court should evaluate the interrelatedness between the plaintiffs claims against the nonsignatory (the insurance carrier) and the underlying contract containing the arbitration provisions
(the loan contract). See id. at 1169 (Maddox, J., dissenting). Second, the court should also
analyze the relationship between all of the contracting parties. See id. (Maddox, J., dissenting).
Indeed, Justice Maddox found that the plaintiffs claims against the insurance carrier were
substantially related to the underlying loan agreement. See id. (Maddox, J., dissenting).
Justice Maddox also found a close relationship between the plaintiff, the insurance carrier, and
the lender because the loan financed the premiums for the insurance policy. See id. (Maddox,
J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice Maddox reasoned that the plaintiff should be equitably
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2. Analytical Focus on Intent Produces Contrary Results
Interestingly, the Alabama Supreme Court has applied its
intent analysis and reached varying results when faced with nearly
identical sets of facts. For example, Ex parte Gates178 and Ex parte
Martin179 featured identically situated litigants, but the court reached
contrary results.
In Gates, the plaintiff entered into a Manufactured Home
Retail Installment contract with defendant vendor for the purchase of
a mobile home.18° The sales agreement contained a provision submitting disputes " 'arising from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract' " to arbitration. 18' The
manufacturer of the home never signed the underlying sales contract. 112 When a dispute arose over construction of the home, the
plaintiff sued both the vendor and the manufacturer.183 At trial, the
nonsignatory manufacturer successfully moved to compel arbitration
of the plaintiffs claims.18'
The plaintiff petitioned the Alabama
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus vacating the trial court's decision.'8
As in Ex parte Jones, the court sought to determine whether
the plaintiff, by entering into a mobile home sales contract with the
vendor, thereby intended to arbitrate its current dispute with the
manufacturer. 8 7 The court interpreted the language of the arbitration clause, which specifically covered "'disputes... arising from or
relating to [the] Contract or the relationships... result[ing] from
[the] Contract.'"88 The court considered such language to be broad in
scope and indicative of the contracting parties' intent to arbitrate a
broad range of disputes. 8 9 Therefore, the court found the plaintiffestopped from circumventing arbitration by arguing the absence of an agreement with the
insurance company. See id. at 1169-70 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
178. 675 So. 2d 371 (Ala. 1996).
179. 703 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1996).
180. See Gates, 675 So. 2d at 373.
181. Id. (quoting from the sales agreement).
182. See id.
183. See id. The plaintiff alleged "breach of express and implied warranties, fraud, negligent or wanton installation, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act." Id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 372.
186. 686 So. 2d 1166, 1167-68 (Ala. 1996).
187. See Gates, 675 So. 2d at 373-74 (remarking that the arbitration issue is "guided by
considering the intent ofthe parties").
188. See id. at 373 (quoting from the sales agreement).
189. See id. at 374. The court did state that the plaintiffs claims relied upon the terms of
the installment contract. See id at 374-75. But the court was not applying an equitable
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signatory's intent to arbitrate extended to claims against the nonsignatory manufacturer. 19°
The court appeared to reverse itself in Ex parte Martin, however, when faced with a nearly identical set of facts. 19' In Martin, the
plaintiff also purchased a mobile home and thereafter entered into a
sales contract with defendant vendor. 192 The sales contract contained
an arbitration clause.' s3 As in Gates, the manufacturer of the home
was not a party to the underlying buyer-vendor agreement. 94 The
plaintiff later sued the vendor for fraud, negligence, and breach of
warranty, and the manufacturer for breach of warranty. 195 Contrary
could
to Gates, the court held that the manufacturer as nonsignatory
96
plaintiff.
signatory
the
with
not compel arbitration
The court distinguished Martin from Gates on the basis of
contract interpretation. 197 The court argued that the language of the
arbitration provision in Gates "was particularly broad, encompassing
not only the 'disputes, claims, or controversies arising from' the contract, but also 'the relationships' that resulted from it."198 But in a
return to the reasoning of Jones, the court found the relevant arbitration clause in Martin to be narrow. 99 The court emphasized the fact
that the arbitration language referred only to the plaintiff and the
vendor.200 Therefore, the arbitration provision contemplated disputes
between only those specific parties. 20 , Disputes with the nonsignatory

estoppel analysis. Under the federal doctrine, the court would first analyze the relationship
between the plaintiffs claims and the underlying contract containing the arbitration provision.
See id. at 373-74. The court began its analysis with the intent of the parties and examined the
breadth of the arbitration provision as a means of determining intent. See supra notes 162-64
and accompanying text.
190. See Gates, 675 So. 2d at 374-75; see also Exparte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250, 251 (Ala. 1996)
(finding that a "Retail Buyer's Order" signed by the plaintiff and the defendant automobile
dealership, which contained an arbitration agreement, was indeed broad enough to include the
plaintiffs claims against the dealership's salesman, who never signed the underlying contract).
191. See 703 So. 2d 883, 888 (Ala. 1996).
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.; see also Gates, 675 So. 2d at 373.
195. See Martin, 703 So. 2d at 884.
196. See id. at 886-87.
197. See id. at 886.
198. Id. (quoting Gates, 675 So. 2d at 374).
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 886-87. The dissent argued for the application of equitable estoppel to allow
"nonsignatories to compel arbitration where there is a close relationship between a signatory
and the nonsignatory and a close connection between the claims subject to the arbitration clause
and the nonsignatory's obligations and duties under the contract." Id. at 888 (Hooper, C.J.,
dissenting).
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manufacturer consequently fell outside the provision and were not
202
arbitrable.
2o3
Jones and Martin appear radically divergent from Gates.
But an understanding of the court's methodological approach reconciles the disparity. The Alabama Supreme Court scrutinizes the language of the relevant arbitration provision to ascertain the scope of
the parties' intent to arbitrate. This approach narrowly constructs
intent from the language of the agreement. The approach unfortunately produces uncertainty as the court interprets on a case-by-case
basis the variations in the contractual wording of arbitration clauses.
As seen, a slight alteration in language may substantially alter the
°4
"intent" of the parties.2

202. See id.at 887.
203. See Ponder, supra note 150, at 247-48, for a thorough discussion of the inconsistent
Alabama Supreme Court decisions concerning nonsignatories and arbitration. Ponder explains
the disparities in this line of cases as the result of a slow move towards federal policy. See id. at
249-50. She suggests that the Alabama Supreme Court shifts toward federal principles when
the court perceives what Ponder refers to as "agency relationships" between signatories and
nonsignatories. Id. at 250. For example, Ponder remarks that in Gates, a nonsignatory
manufacturer was closely related to a vendor in a single transaction of selling a home to the
plaintiff. See id. In contrast, Ponder suggests that in Jones, the court denied a nonsignatory
the right to compel arbitration because the parties were not overtly engaged in a single
transaction (at least not from the perspective of the plaintiff). See id. She writes that in Jones
"the defendants were a loan agency and the issuer of a collateral insurance policy. The plaintiffs
did not even know that there was a separate insurance company involved until after their car
was destroyed." Id.
This Note interprets the Alabama Supreme Court's seemingly sporadic decisions in cases
like Gates and Jones as a function of the court's case-by-case determination of intent based on
language of the underlying contract. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text. Also, at
the time Ponder's article appeared, the Supreme Court of Alabama had yet to withdraw its first
Isbell opinion. As Ponder notes, the court's first decision in Ex parte Isbell, No. 1951384, 1997
WL 99725 (Ala. March 7, 1997), withdrawn and replaced,Ex parte Isbell, No. CV-95-8362, 1997
WL 679418 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997), acknowledged the federal trend toward enforcement of
arbitration provisions by nonsignatories. See Ponder, supra note 150, at 248. Ponder notes the
court's emphasis in the first Isbell opinion on the fact that all of the defendants participated in a
single business relationship in the sale of a mobile home. See id. at 250. Indeed, the court, in
the first Isbell opinion, allowed the nonsignatory to enforce arbitration, thereby supporting
Ponder's argument that the court's perception of such transactional relationships favors
adherence to federal principles. See id. at 248. But this Note contends that the court's final
Isbell decision downplays any emphasis on transactional relationships. The final Isbell opinion
ultimately limits the federal principle of equitable estoppel to a comparison between plaintiffs
claims and the underlying contract containing the arbitration provision and dismisses what this
Note labels the nexus, or second, prong of equitable estoppel.
204. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text. Ex parte Stallings & Sons, Inc., 670
So. 2d 861, 862-63 (Ala. 1995), demonstrates the Alabama Supreme Court's divergence from
federal authority in its analytical focus on intent. In Stallings, a hospital board hired the
plaintiff to assist in the construction of a building addition. See id. at 861-62. The hospital
board also hired an architectural firm to design and supervise the project. See id. The
plaintiff's contract with the board contained a provision submitting " '[a n y controversy or claim
arising out of or related to the Contract... [to] arbitration.'" Id. at 862 (quoting this contract).
The agreement between the board and the firm lacked a similar provision. See id.
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D. The Alabama Supreme Court'sMovement Towards
EquitableEstoppel
The Alabama Supreme Court recently announced its position
towards equitable estoppel in Ex parte Isbell.25 This case represents
the court's most complete analysis of federal arbitration principles to
date. Isbell charts the court's trajectory towards acceptance of federal
principles while simultaneously reaffirming "intent" as the core of
enforceable arbitration agreements.
In Isbell, the plaintiff once again bought a mobile home.20 The
plaintiff and vendor executed a "Manufactured Home Retail
Installment Contract and Security Agreement" containing an arbitration provision.27 Although the plaintiff did receive a separate warranty agreement from the manufacturer of the mobile home as a part
of the original purchase, the manufacturer was not a party to the
28
sales contract containing the arbitration clause.
The plaintiff brought suit against the vendor, the vendor's
agent, and the manufacturer after allegedly discovering defects in the

The plaintiff later sued the architectural firm for alleged suppression of information and
negligent performance of its duties, which resulted in economic harm to the plaintiff. The firm
sought to compel arbitration with the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement between the plaintiff
and the hospital board. See id. The court denied arbitration, looking to the specific language of
the contract, which stated that " '[no arbitration arising out of or relating to [the contract] shall
include.., the Architect..., except by written consent containing specific reference to the
Agreement [between plaintiff and board] and signed by the Architect.'" Id. at 863 (quoting this
contract).
Although the language of the provision clearly appeared to foreclose arbitration, federal
authority might have provided a different result. Indeed, the court noted the factual similarity
of the Stallings case to McBro Planning& Development Co. v. TriangleElectrical Construction
Co., where a plaintiff contractor brought an action against a construction manager for intentional interference with contract and negligence. See 741 F.2d 342, 343 (11th Cir. 1984). In
McBro, the construction manager sought to compel arbitration of the claim pursuant to an
arbitration provision in the contract between the plaintiff and the hospital funding the project
(and pursuant to the terms of a similar contract between the manager and the hospital). See id.
The court specifically noted that the contract between the plaintiff and the hospital refuted any
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the construction manager. See id. Although
this contractual waiver might theoretically foreclose arbitration between the plaintiff and the
manager, the court held that the plaintiff was equitably estopped from asserting the lack of an
agreement with the manager as a bar to arbitration because of "the close relationship of the
three entities here involved. . . and the close relationship of the alleged wrongs to [the manager's] contractual duties to perform as construction manager." Id. In contrast, the Stallings
court privileged contractual language as manifesting intent over an estoppel analysis. See
Stallings,670 So. 2d at 863.
205. No. CV-95-8362, 1997 WL 679418 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997).
206. See id. at *1.
207. See id.
208. See id. at *2 (noting that the manufacturer disclaimed liability for agreements other
than the warranty).
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product.2°9 All of the defendants, including the nonsignatory manufacturer, moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the
installment contract. 210 In determining whether the nonsignatory
manufacturer could enforce the arbitration clause against the plaintiff-buyer pursuant to the underlying installment contract, the court
discussed the applicability of equitable estoppel to the facts of the
case. 211 The court reviewed the key federal decisions of Sunkist2l2 and
McBro,213 but ultimately relied on the Middle District of Alabama
case, Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc.,214 because of its factual similarities to the instant case.215 As in Isbell, the Wilson case addressed a
mobile home purchaser seeking to establish the nonsignatory manufacturer's liability for breach of warranty while avoiding the manufacturer's attempt to compel arbitration pursuant to an underlying sales
contract with the vendor.2 6 The Alabama Supreme Court held that
under Wilson, a nonsignatory defendant must establish its right to
enforce an arbitration provision against a plaintiff-signatory by demonstrating that the plaintiffs claim alleges the defendant's breach of
217
duties generated by the underlying contract itself.
Under the Wilson formulation, the Isbell court held that equitable estoppel was inapplicable to the facts at issue. 218 The court
found that the plaintiffs warranty claims against the manufacturer
had nothing to do with the underlying sales contract with the vendor
and therefore did not meet the first prong of the equitable estoppel
test. 2 9 Therefore, the court held that the warranty claim against the

manufacturer was not arbitrable. 2 0

209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at *4-*8.
212. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993).
213. See McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.
1984).
214. 954 F. Supp 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997).
215. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *4-*6.
216. See Wilson, 954 F. Supp. at 1532.
217. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *8.
218. See id. at *12; see also Exparte Grant, No. CV-95-240, 1997 WL 707055, at *1-2 (Ala.
Nov. 14, 1997) (refusing to enforce arbitration when finding that no contract existed, but
nevertheless citing Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *1, as authority in stating that the defendant
manufacturer of a mobile home may not compel arbitration of the plaintiff-buyer's complaint
against it when the manufacturer was not a party to the underlying contract between the buyer
and the vendor).
219. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *10.
220. See id. at *12-*13. The court ultimately returned to an intent-based anaysis and held
"that the arbitration provisions in this case [were] not broad enough to include the claims
against [the nonsignatory]." See id. at *12.
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The dissent in Isbell questioned the majority's wisdom in relying on a federal district court's decision as opposed to established
authority from the Eleventh Circuit.21 The dissent further remarked
that "[t]he FAA favors arbitration, and the federal courts have allowed nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration with signatories."222 The dissent clearly argued for the applica-

tion of federal arbitration law to enforce arbitration,223 while the ma-

jority held that equitable estoppel was inapplicable on these facts. 224

The majority was operating under a narrower interpretation of federal policy than the dissent. Upon further examination of Isbell, it
becomes clear that the majority narrowed the breadth of federal arbitration law by altering the elements of equitable estoppel itself.
E. The Alabama Supreme Court'sDerivative Version of
EquitableEstoppel
1. The First Prong: The Relationship Between Signatory's
Claims and Underlying Contract
Equitable estoppel always begins with an initial determination
of the interrelatedness between the plaintiffs claims and the
underlying contract containing the arbitration provision.2 5 A court's
definition of interrelatedness is crucial. The applicability of equitable
estoppel to a set of facts depends upon the type of relationship a court
requires between the plaintiffs claims and the contract providing for
arbitration. According to the majority in Isbell, the plaintiffs claims
sufficiently correspond to the underlying contract when the
nonsignatory's potential liability derives from the terms of the
contract. 226
Indeed, federal authority supports this position. In McBro, the
Eleventh Circuit applied equitable estoppel when it specifically found
that the nonsignatory "breached the duties and responsibilities assigned it by the [underlying] agreement" containing the arbitration
provision. 227 In Hughes Masonry, the Seventh Circuit applied equita221. See id. at *16 (Hooper, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Hooper, C.J., dissenting).
223. See id. (Hooper, C.J., dissenting).
224. See id. at *8-*10.
225. See supraPart II.B.4.a.
226. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *8.
227. McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co, 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir.
1984); see also supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
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ble estoppel when the plaintiffs claims "alleged [the nonsignatory's]
breach of the obligations assigned to it in the [underlying] agreement.228
In contrast to the Isbell majority, Alabama Supreme Court
Justices Maddox and Hooper have continuously lobbied for a broader
interpretation of federal principles and have repeatedly dissented to
the court's limited enforcement of arbitration with nonsignatories.229
An examination of Justice Maddox's dissent in Ex parte Jones illustrates these arguments 0 When the plaintiff in Jones sued the insurance company for fraud and bad faith failure to pay, the court denied
the nonsignatory insurance company's motion to compel arbitration of
plaintiffs suit pursuant to the terms of the loan contract.2 1 Justice
Maddox dissented and argued for the application of equitable estoppel.232

Justice Maddox argued that the plaintiffs claims against the
nonsignatory insurance company were "'founded on and are intertwined with the facts surrounding the underlying contract that contains the arbitration clause.'s33 Justice Maddox noted a transactional connection between the plaintiffs claims and the underlying
contract.24 In other words, the plaintiffs claims must arise out of the
"facts surrounding the underlying contract," but not the contract

itself.235 Even a collateral relationship between the plaintiffs claims

and the underlying agreement would satisfy this test.

228. Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 838 (7th
Cir. 1981); see also supranotes 72-88 and accompanying text.
229. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *14-*15 (Hooper, C.J., dissenting) (arguing for the
application of federal arbitration principles); Exparte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883, 887-89 (Ala. 1997)
(Hooper, C.J., dissenting) (same); id. at 889-90 (Maddox, J., dissenting) (same); Ex Parte
Stripling, 694 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Ala. 1997) (Maddox, J., dissenting) (same); Exparte Jones, 686
So. 2d 1166, 1168-70 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting) (same).
230. See 686 So. 2d at 1168-71 (Maddox, J., dissenting). In Jones, the plaintiff entered into
a loan arrangement with the defendant lender and simultaneously acquired a separate
insurance policy as part of the same financing package. The issuing insurance company,
however, was not a party to the loan contract containing the arbitration provision. See id. at
1167; see also supranotes 165-69 and accompanying text.
231. See Jones, 686 So. 2d at 1167-68.
232. See id. at 1168-70 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1168 (Maddox, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte Jones, No. 1950117, 1996 WL
292060, at *2 (Ala. May 31, 1996), withdrawn and replaced, 686 So. 2d 1166 (Ala. 1996))
(emphasis added). Justice Maddox was actually quoting from the original Jones opinion, which
the court withdrew and replaced with the current opinion. Therefore, the reasoning of the first
withdrawn opinion (with which Justice Maddox concurred) became the heart of Justice
Maddox's dissent to the new majority opinion.
234. See id. (Maddox, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Maddox, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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In Jones, the plaintiffs claims against the nonsignatory insurance company directly evolved from the financing transaction between
the plaintiff and the lender.236 Based on this fact, Justice Maddox
favored arbitration, arguing that "'if the [loan] contract containing
the arbitration provision did not exist, neither would the... insur-

ance contract.'

"237

Under this analysis, arbitration would be entirely appropriate
on the facts of Isbell. In Isbell, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of
a mobile home alleging breach of a warranty agreement received by
plaintiff in connection with the buyer-vendor sales contract. 2 8 The
purchase of the mobile home is factually related to the warranty:
"'[I]f the plaintiffs had never purchased their mobile homes, they
would not have been protected by the warranties that came with
them.' "239 The plaintiffs claims would clearly arise out of the "'facts
surrounding the underlying contract [containing] the arbitration

clause.'

"240

Justice Maddox's position also finds support in federal authority. In Sunkist, Sunkist Growers alleged that Del Monte corporation
caused its newly acquired subsidiary (SSD) to breach the terms of a
licensing agreement. 241 The Sunkist court found that Sunkist
Growers' claims arose from the licensing agreement because the
claims presumed the existence of the licensing agreement. 242 Sunkist
Growers merely alleged that Del Monte's improper conduct caused its
subsidiary to abandon the licensing agreement. 243 The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the licensing agreement did not assign Del Monte
specific duties and obligations towards Sunkist Growers. 244 Del
Monte's wrongs were merely related to the licensing agreement in
that Del Monte's management of its subsidiary interfered with the
agreement. The Sunkist court found that Sunkist Growers' claims
arose out of the licensing agreement because the claim presumed the

236. See id. at 1167.
237. Id. at 1168 (Maddox, J., dissenting) (quoting from the original Jones majority opinion).
238. See Exparte Isbell, No. CV-95-8362, 1997 WL 679418, at *8 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997).
239. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Waverlee, 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1536-37 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd
without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997)).
240. See Jones, 686 So. 2d at 1168 (Maddox, J., dissenting) (quoting from the original Jones
majority opinion) (emphasis added). Justice Maddox used this language in his dissent in Jones.
See supra notes 230, 165-69 and accompanying text for a summary of the facts of Jones.
241. See Sunkist Soft Drinks v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1993);
see also supra notes 118-3 1 and accompanying text.
242. See Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 758.

243. See id.
244. See id. at 757.
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existence of the licensing agreement2 5 Del Monte's indirect
interference with the licensing agreement could not have existed
without the agreement itself.26 In other words, the claim arose out of
a transactioninvolving the underlying contrast.
2. The Nexus Prong: Relationship Between Signatory and
Nonsignatory Entities
The dissent in Isbell clearly contemplated the federal tendency
to examine the relationship between signatories and nonsignatories in
determining the latter's right to compel arbitration. Indeed, the dissent noted that "the weight of authority from the federal circuit courts
of appeals favor[s] a nonsignatory in close relationship with the signatories to an arbitration agreement."247 As discussed previously, a tight
relationship between signatory and nonsignatory bolsters the argument for application of equitable estoppel.28
But in Isbell, the court did not consider the general relationship between the parties as an element of the estoppel analysis.
Rather, the court initially identified the plaintiffs warranty claims
against the manufacturer as collateral to the uiderlying buyer-vendor
sales contract and consequently held that the claims did not arise out
of that sales contract for the purposes of arbitration249 The court
never entertained the possibility that a close relationship between

245. See id.
246. See id ("Although Sunkist does not rely exclusively on the license agreement to
support its claims, each claim presumes the existence of such an agreement."). But see McBro
Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting
that the 'contractor's claim against the construction manager was that the manager breached
the duties and responsibilities assigned it by the owner-contractor agreement"); Hughes
Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County Sch. Bldg. Corp., 659 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1981)
('[Plaintiffl alleged, as basis for its claims against [nonsignatory defendant], that [the defendant]. . . failed to carry out various duties and responsibilities specified in the [underlying]
agreement.").
247. Ex parte Isbell, No. CV-95-8362, 1997 WL 679418, at *16 (Ala. Oct. 31, 1997). On
October 3, 1997, the Alabama Supreme Court denied an application to rehear Ex parte Martin,
703 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1997). In the original opinion, the court refused to apply equitable estoppel
to force the plaintiff-buyer of a mobile home to arbitrate its claims against the nonsignatory
manufacturer. See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text. Justice Maddox dissented to
the court's denial of the application for rehearing and reiterated the importance of examining
the relationship between signatory and nonsignatory parties. See Martin, 703 So. 2d at 890-91
(Maddox, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing). Justice Maddox stated that an estoppel
analysis "requires a determination of the closeness of the relationship (i.e., the application of a
"close relationship" test) between the signatories and the nonsignatories in regard to the underlying contract obligation." Id. at 891 (Maddox, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
248. See supranotes 108-35 and accompanying text.
249. See Isbell, 1997 WL 679418, at *10.
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signatory and nonsignatory parties might support an estoppel analysis.
The court's reluctance to apply the nexus prong of the test
stems from a reluctance to expand the scope of equitable estoppel
itself. The first element of equitable estoppel honors the intent of
contracting parties by specifically attaching the litigant's claims to a
contract containing an arbitration provision. Substantial interrelatedness compels a finding that the claims arise from the contact. 250 A
court must simply find that the dispute itself is "intimately founded
in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations."' 1
But federal authority suggests that when a party's claims bear
a weak or collateral relationship to the underlying contract containing
the arbitration provision, a close relationship between contesting
parties might compensate for this deficiency. 252 Therefore, equitable
estoppel may force a party to arbitrate disputes with a nonsignatory
when the fundamental dispute itself does not directly arise out of a
contract containing an arbitration provision but when all parties are
engaged in a single transaction. 253 In other words, equitable estoppel
may privilege arbitration itself over the assent of the contracting
parties. Therefore, the Alabama Supreme Court's dismissal of the
nexus prong of equitable estoppel functions to protect the intent of
contracting parties.
F. A Return to TraditionalPrinciplesof Estoppel
The Alabama Supreme Court's disregard of the nexus prong
merges the doctrine of equitable estoppel with more traditional estoppel analysis. Under traditional estoppel, a nonsignatory that affirmatively derives a benefit from a contract is estopped from refusing to
2
submit to the contract's arbitration provision.M
Under the Alabama
Supreme Court's vision of equitable estoppel, a signatory who uses a
contract to assign duties and obligations to a nonsignatory likewise
benefits from the contract and is estopped from denying operation of
the arbitration provision within that same contract. 255

250. See supra Part II.B.4.a.
251. Hughes Masonry, 659 F.2d at 841 n.9.
252. See supra notes 108-35 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 108-35 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
255. See Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp 1530, 1536 (M.D. Ala.), affid without
opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997). Traditional notions of estoppel were always at the heart
of the alternative theory of equitable estoppel. In Hughes Masonry, the court stated that the

signatory plaintiff could not use a contract to establish its case against a nonsignatory and then
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This version of equitable estoppel comports exactly with the
Alabama Supreme Court's analytical focus on intent. A signatory
deriving a benefit from a contract by using it as a basis for liability
clearly assents to those terms of the contract governing the dispute.
The signatory's claim itself manifests an intent to arbitrate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Alabama Supreme Court's vision of equitable estoppel
appropriately privileges intent. Following the Alabama Supreme
Court's approach, when a party to a contract containing an arbitration
agreement specifically attempts to derive a nonsignatory's duties from
the terms of that contract, the provisions of the agreement regulate
the dispute and establish arbitration as the governing resolution
forum.26 Under these circumstances, equitable estoppel is a legitimate proxy of a party's intent to arbitrate. A signatory's assent to a
contract containing a broad arbitration provision signifies assent to
the arbitration of an expansive range of disputes arising out of the
agreement. 257 When a signatory uses the terms of that contract to
extend liability to a nonsignatory, the signatory's cause of action bears
intimate association with the underlying contract. 25 8 Indeed, the signatory's claims literally arise out of the underlying contract. 259 The
cause of action itself constructively renders the nonsignatory a party
to the contract.
The absence of the nonsignatory's assent to the contract and
the accompanying arbitration provision is irrelevant. The signatory
avoid the contract's arbitration provisions. See 659 F.2d at 839; see also American Ins. Co. v.
Cazort, 871 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Ark. 1994) (allowing a nonsignatory to compel arbitration and
stating that "since the signatory was suing the nonsignatory for breach of the contract which
contained the arbitration agreement, it should not be able to turn around and deny that the
nonsignatory was a party to the agreement in order to avoid arbitration"). This Note, however,
argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel has grown into a two-fold examination: (1) an
examination of the relationship between a signatory's claim and the contract containing the
arbitration provision; and (2) an examination of the nexus between signatory and nonsignatory
entities. In Sunkist, for example, Sunkist Growers sued the nonsignatory Del Monte for
allegedly causing its subsidiary to breach a licensing agreement. See Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc.
v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 758 (11th Cir. 1993). Sunkist Growers did not derive a
benefit from the contract in the sense that it used the contract itself to generate Del Monte's
duties and obligations. Del Monte's liability to plaintiff flowed from Del Monte's alleged
interference with the contract, as opposed to Del Monte's breach of terms assigned it in the
contract.
256. See supranotes 217 & 226 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 70-90,205-17, & 225-26 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 69-102 & 200-19 and accompanying text.
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party's claims essentially force the nonsignatory's unwilling "assent"
to the terms of the contract through an attempted imposition of liability. Because the claim itself forces assent upon the nonsignatory, the
signatory party may not excise the arbitration provision from the
contract by asserting the absence of an arbitration agreement be260
tween itself and the nonsignatory.
An estoppel analysis should not extend beyond this focus on
intent. The proximity of signatory and nonsignatory entities in a
single transaction should not generate an intent to arbitrate when
none exists in the first place.261 The Alabama Supreme Court
appropriately limits equitable estoppel to the examination of the
signatory's claims in relation to the underlying contract containing an
arbitration provision. 262
Under the Alabama Supreme Court's
analysis, intent constitutes the center of the enforceable arbitration
agreement.
David F. Sawrie*

260. See supra note 255 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proximity between
traditional estoppel and equitable estoppel.
261. See supraParts II.B.5, Ill.E.2, III.F.
262. See supraPart III.E.
*
For my parents.

